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THE RIGHT OF COUNSEL IN STUDENT DISCIPLINARY
HEARINGS
MARTIN A. FREY*
INTRODUCTION
Among the recommendations of the President's Commission on
Campus Unrest was that colleges and universities must respond more
effectively to violent disorder.
Perpetrators of violence must be identified, removed from the
university as swiftly as possible and prosecuted vigorously by
the appropriate agencies of law enforcement. Universities have
not adequately prepared themselves to respond to disruption.
They have been without suitable plans, rules or sanctions. Some
administrators and faculty members have responded irreso-
lutely.1
Fortunately, most disciplinary hearings are not the result of violent
confrontations between students and law enforcement authorities. Never-
theless, the Commission underlines the importance of well constructed
and fairly administered disciplinary hearings.
Control and regulation of the conduct and behavior of students
begins with the formation of university rules, regulations, codes and
policies. Responsibility for developing these means of control and regula-
tion is usually given to the dean of students and his staff or to a campus
committee. Singly or collectively they gather bits of information on the
desirability of a specific rule. Occasionally, the rule making group finds
it beneficial to invite students, faculty and other members of the campus
family to share their experiences and state their preferences. Once the
rule has been formulated, an apparatus is established to deal with
offenders. The report of a breach triggers investigation.2  If an in-
fraction is revealed, the university may lodge a formal disciplinary
charge against the student. When the student is faced with the dis-
ciplinary hearing his right to counsel becomes an issue.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University.
1. Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 27, 1970, at 30, col. 2.
2. The Supreme Court in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), has held that due
process does not require a right to counsel during the investigation stage of the
administrative process.
3. The public educational institution, however, must be distinguished from the
private institution because the former involves state action while the latter does not.
THE RIGHT OF COUNSEL
The right to counsel cannot be determined by whether the hearing
was administrative in nature. Rather, the issue will depend upon the
scope of inquiry of the panel, the nature of allegations and the possible
consequences of the proceedings.' This article seeks to explore the
factors which could be said to create a right to counsel and to present
tangential problems once a right has been recognized.
HEARINGS TO DETERMINrE EVIDENTIARY FACTS
In some instances, a hearing may be held to determine exactly what
acts the student committed. Such hearings are essentially trials with the
administrative agency acting as the jury. For the purpose of this article,
hearings to determine what the student did, where and when the incident
took place and with what motive or intent the act was committed are
referred to as evidentiary hearings.5
Without state action, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and all that
goes with it has no application to the educational institution. While several attempts
have been made to extend the concept of state action to the private institution, they
have proved unsuccessful. E.g., Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp.
535, 546-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
4. Cosine v. Board of Educ., 50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
aff'd mein., 27 App. Div. 2d 905, 281 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1967), presents an example
considering the crucial question as one of characterization of the whole proceeding
instead of considering the issues in dispute, the type of hearing which should be used
to resolve these issues and the counsel question within the requisite type of hearing.
In Cosine the child's mother sought to have her attorney present at a hearing scheduled
to discuss her son's temporary suspension from public school because of misconduct.
The court upheld the denial of this request:
These hearings are simply interviews or conferences which include school
officials and the child's parents. Further, they are purely administrative in
nature, and are never punitive. The parents are fully appraised of all of the
facts and are furnished with copies of all information in respondent's possession.
Respondent is not statutorily mandated to grant a parent a hearing.
Moreover, because the hearing or conference is administrative in nature, the
petitioner is not entitled to be represented by counsel. In fact, the very purpose
of the interview would be frustrated or impeded by presence of counsel, who
might be tempted to turn the conference into a quasi-judicial hearing.
Id., 270 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
Cosine was subsequently distinguished in Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281
N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967), a case involving the deprivation of state high school
examination privileges, on the ground that Goldwyn involved punitive sanctions.
5. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.01, at 407-11 (1958)
[hereinafter referred to as DAvIS]. Professor Davis defines a hearing as an oral
proceeding before a tribunal. Id. § 7.01, at 407. He prefers the term "trial" and "trial type
of hearing" when referring to hearings to determine evidentiary facts. Id. § 7.01 at
408 n.4.
The choice of terminology may be crucial in the determination of the substantive
issue of a particular case. In Koblitz 'v. Western Reserve Univ., 11 Ohio C. Dec. 515,
21 Ohio C.C.R. 144 (1901), the court held that a student had a right of confrontation
but not to a trial. There is also fear of the word "adversary." In Barker sk Hardway,
283 F. Supp. 228, (S.D. W. Va. 1968), the court relied on Dixon v. Alabama State
Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), stating that
Dixon expressly limited the hearing procedure to non-adversary proceedings when, in
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Rights to an Evidentiary Hearing
Clearly, facts which pertain to the actual conduct of an individual
should not be determined without giving the individual an opportunity
to present the facts as he knows them and to cross-examine those who
contradict him.6 The question of whether a student is deprived of due
process if expelled from a state university without an evidentiary hearing
was settled in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education That
decision, however, does not require an evidentiary hearing for all acts
of misconduct. The court balanced the interests of the state board with
the interests of the student faced with expulsion.'
The nature of the hearing should vary depending upon the
circumstances of the particular case. The case before us [expul-
sion] requires something more than an informal interview
with an administrative authority of the college.... [A] charge
of misconduct . . . depends upon a collection of the facts con-
cerning the charged misconduct, easily colored by the point of
view of the witnesses. In such circumstances, a hearing which
gives the Board or the administrative authorities of the college
an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail is best
suited to protect the rights of all involved. . . . [A full dress
hearing] might be detrimental to the college's educational at-
mosphere and impractical to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudi-
ments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved without
encroaching upon the interests of the college.'
fact, Dixon stressed that "the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved
without encroaching upon the interests of the college." 294 F.2d at 159. Davis v.
Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), refers to the hearing as "quasi-judicial."
Id. at 526. In Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967), procedural in-
formality equated with non-adversity. Id. at 812.
6. See 1 DAVIs § 7.02, at 412-15.
7. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
8. The balance changes radically when termination of the educational pursuit is
no longer involved. For example, when the government's power is reprimand and the
private interest is the right not to be scolded, the governmental power would be almost
absolute and the private interest so slight that no evidentiary hearing would be required.
9. Id. at 158-59. The court in Dixon indicated that "a full-dress judicial hearing,
with a right to cross-examine witnesses . . ." is not required because it might be
"detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere .... " Id. at 159. Many institutions,
however, do not find the right of cross-examination detrimental since they provide that
right. See Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725,
731 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747,
752 (W.D. La. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D. Colo. 1968);
Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). Contra, Hammond
v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 949 (D.S.C. 1967). The court in
Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562, 567 (W.D. Wis. 1968), included the right of
cross-examination as a required procedural safeguard.
THE RIGHT OF COUNSEL
Pre-Dixon decisions denied student rights on the grounds that
attendance at the university was a privilege that could be terminated by
the university.1" It is clear now that the right versus privilege argument
is no longer viable to determine whether there is a deprivation of liberty
or property without due process.11 Instead, injury to the individual is
now considered; if sufficient injury may result, the Constitution requires
that the university's conduct be consonant with due process. The loss of
one's opportunity to receive an education is clearly a substantial injury."
Right to Counsel at Evidentiary Hearings
The question remains whether the student has a right to be re-
presented at the evidentiary hearing by counsel. The civil nature of the
disciplinary proceedings renders the sixth amendment's guarantee of
right to counsel inapplicable.' Where there is no administrative rule
or state or federal law to provide for counsel, the right to counsel will
not exist unless the right can be read into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. There has been no decision declaring that legal
representation is essential for procedural due process in student dis-
ciplinary hearings." The most that has been said is that under "rare and
10. See Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
11. This is especially true in the area of public employment. See Slochower v.
Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the Court
commented that "[o]ne may not have a constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but the
Government may not prohibit one from going there unless by means consonant with
due process of law." Id. at 894. See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
12. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a unanimous Court in Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1955), emphasized the importance of education.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Id. at 493.
13. French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (ED. La. 1969).
14. See French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969) ; Barker v. Hard-
way, 283 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. W. Va. 1968). In Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968), a group of students were expelled
without notification of the disciplinary charges against them or a chance to present
their individual defenses to the disciplinary committee. In granting a temporary
restraining order immediately reinstating them in good standing with the college,
the order preserved the right of the college to take further disciplinary action after the
students had been given notice of the charges and the opportunity to be represented
by counsel.
One case clearly has recognized the right to counsel as an integral part to a
fair hearing between guidance counselor and student when such is requested
by the student, and the action against the student results from reports of
juvenile authorities.
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exceptional circumstances" legal counsel may be required in a particular
case to guarantee the fundamental concept of fairness.1" The most
important criteria with which to judge the fairness of a particular
hearing are: 1) whether the student is subject to severe injury, 2)
whether the university will proceed through counsel and 3) whether
the student has the ability to defend himself.
Id. at 760. The case referred to was Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). Unknown to the Zanders court, the Madera case had just been
reversed on the counsel issue. Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
15. Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Disci-
pline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Learning, 45 F.R.D. 133, 148-49
(1968). See also Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); French
v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1969); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.
Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. W. Va. 1968).
Some decisions, while not decided on the counsel issue, have indicated that if
there be another disciplinary hearing, the student was entitled to counsel. Brown v.
Greer, 296 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp.
562, 567 (W.D. Wis. 1968) ; Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747,
752 (W.D. La. 1968); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649,
651 (W.D. Mo. 1967); Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899, 905
(Sup. Ct. 1967).
Other cases evidence the fact that some institutions recognize a right to counsel.
Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 407 F.2d 834, 835 (6th Cir. 1969); Powe v. Miles, 407
F.2d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1968); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 164 (W.D. Mo.
1968); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731
(M.D. Ala. 1968); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613, 615 (M.D.
Ala. 1967) ; Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56, 57-58 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
The first case after Dixon to discuss counsel was Due v. Florida A & M Univ.,
233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963):
A fair reading of the Dixon case shows that it is not necessary to due process
requirements that a full scale judicial trial be conducted by a university
disciplinary committee with qualified attorneys either present or formally
waived as in a felonious charge under the criminal law.
Id. at 403. It was unfortunate that this statement linked the counsel issue with that of a
full-dress judicial hearing. Since Dixon held that it did not intend to imply that a full-
dress judicial hearing was required but only that the rudiments of an adversary proceed-
ing could be preserved without encroaching upon the interests of the institution, any issue
connected with the requirement of a full-dress judicial hearing would be tainted.
Therefore, the Due court, in fact, did not reach the counsel in the type of adversary pro-
ceeding envisioned by Dixon. However, from its facts and holding, Due could be used to
support the contention that the student has no right to counsel in an evidentiary hearing
although the possible injury is expulsion or indefinite suspension.
In the following cases, the counsel issue was raised but not decided by the court:
Segal v. Jacobson, 295 F. Supp. 1121, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (student did not present
fact issues necessary for decision before the constitutional claims could be reached);
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 949 (D.S.C. 1967)
(decided on the ground that the rule under which the students were suspended violated
free speech).
In the following cases, the counsel issue was raised and rejected by'the court:
Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Wasson v. Trowbridge,
382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.
W. Va. 1968); Cosine v. Board of Educ., 50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232
(Sup. Ct. 1966). For additional discussion see Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment
and University Disciplinary Procedures, 34 Mo. L REv. 236, 249-51 (1969).
THE RIGHT OF COUNSEL
Specific Standards of Fairness
The student's peril may include expulsion, indefinite suspension,
short suspension, removal of diploma privileges, long probation, short
probation, change of environment and reprimand. The result of the
action by the administrator in an expulsion case would be the drastic
and complete termination of the educational experience in that particular
institution.x6 This action would effectively deny an education that is
vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society. Without sufficient education
the student would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy
life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and
responsibilities of a good citizen.1 7 Indefinite suspension has been deemed
to be the equivalent of an expulsion." Although the student's peril in
the short suspension has not been discussed by the courts, it would appear
to decrease from the expulsion and indefinite suspension situations al-
though the educational experience at that institution is temporarily
terminated. One reason for lack of discussion on this subject is the
fact that hearings which result in short suspension begin by putting the
student in peril of indefinite suspension. The possible removal of diploma
privileges has been considered by one court to be more than a minor
sanction. 9
The student's peril in the short suspension, long probation and short
probation situations should decrease respectively. Suspension should
definitely be distinguished from probation because in the former there is
a termination of the educational experience in that particular university
while in the latter there is no termination.
[D]isciplinary proceedings which do not involve expulsion or
suspension, but which only deal with lesser penalties such as the
loss of certain social privileges, do not have to be protected by
the same procedural safeguards which are necessary in expulsion
or suspension proceedings."0
16. See Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1967).
17. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1955).
18. See Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 784 n.6 (2d Cir. 1967);
Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
19. In Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967), a
public high school student was prohibited from taking regent's examinations. The
debarring of the student from the examinations would result in her not obtaining a
state diploma. Any future employer of this student, who may require a high school
education, and any institution of higher learning to which she may seek admission
will not accept her affirmation of her educational attainments without a high school
diploma as evidence. The court appropriately felt that these possible sanctions were not
minor.
20. French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1969).
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The hearing to determine whether to change the student's environ-
ment, as distinguished from the expulsion or suspension situation,
would put the student in a lesser degree of peril because the change
would not necessarily result in terminating the student's education.2'
However, the change could have a detrimental effect on the student's
educational experience. Transferring a student from an accelerated pro-
gram to a regular program or moving him from a regular public school
to a special school for students with behavioral problems could mean that
he would be denied the opportunity of receiving an education com-
mensurate with his ability.2" Reprimand would appear to place the
student at the lowest level of peril since there would be neither a disrup-
tion of his education nor a change in the program he is pursuing.
Whether the university is represented by counsel is another criteria
to judge the fairness of the proceeding. Legal representation for the
university may exist in many forms. At the evidentiary hearing, the
most apparent form occurs when counsel acts in a prosecutorial role
and presents the case against the student." It is quite possible for legal
representation to be more subtle. A lawyer could instruct an administrator
on presenting the case against the student. He could also be present at
the hearing, either as an advisor 4 or as a member of the administrative
board.25
21. For example, in Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir.
1967), there were only three things that could have happened to the seventh grade
student involved as a direct result of the hearing. He could have been 1) reinstated in
the same school in the same or a different class, 2) transferred to another school of the
same level or 3) transferred to a special school for socially maladjusted children (but
only with the parents' consent). Therefore, the student was placed at the beginning of
the disciplinary procedure at a very low level of peril.
22. Compare Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967) with
Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967) and Madera
v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In the latter two decisions the
court was more informed of the potential of injury to the student.
23. See French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1969); Zanders v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 766, 768 (W.D. La. 1968); Jones v.
State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 194 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
24. See Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 289 (D. Colo. 1968).
25. See Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416, 418 (W.D. Wis.
1969) (former member of the state supreme court) ; Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp.
562, 566 (W.D. Wis. 1968) (former member of the state supreme court); Due v.
Florida A & M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (law professor). The
court in Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968), made the
following observation on the subject of legal advice to an evidentiary board:
The entire record reflects that all members of the committee served with
dedication under extremely trying circumstances. It is unfortunate that the com-
mittee did not have assistance of legal counsel to guide it in regard to the not
uncomplicated problems which arise in cases where speech is mixed with con-
duct because the record demonstrates beyond question that the deficiencies
that require the disciplinary action to be set aside did not result from any
intention on the part of any member of the committee or the part of anyone
THE RIGHT OF COUNSEL
A third specific criteria for judging the fairness of the proceeding
is the ability of the student to defend himself. In the evidentiary hearing
the question reduces to whether he has the ability to make skilled inquiry
into the facts to ascertain whether he has a factual defense and to prepare
and submit it."8
Whether other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are fair
may include everything from the attitude of the hearing officers to the
safeguards built into the procedure. The hearing as a whole would
become tainted if the hearing officer had predetermined the facts before
the student had an opportunity to present his side or if the procedure
did not permit the student to present or review the evidence.
Balancing Criteria to Achieve Fairness
Courts have indicated that, in order to determine in a given case
whether the requirement of counsel is an ingredient of fairness required
by procedural due process, the student's interests must be balanced
against the university's interests. The theoretical polar positions on the
balance would be as follows. At one end would be the case where the
maximum possible penalty could be reprimand handled solely by a non-
legally trained administrator and where the student knew and under-
stood the charge against him and his available defenses. At the other
end would be the case where the maximum possible penalty could be
expulsion, the university proceeded through counsel, the issues were
beyond the comprehension of the student untrained in law and there
existed evidence that the university would not make available to the
student in order for him to prepare his case.
Barker v. Hardway" Madera v. Board of Education28 and French
else not to deal fairly with the students at Lincoln University.
Id. at 173.
26. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), a much broader spectrum of questions
was presented because the juvenile court hearing was not limited to an evidentiary
hearing:
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law,
to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the pro-
ceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it.
Id. at 36.
27. 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W. Va.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969).
28. 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778, (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). For a case comment on the district court decision, see
42 N.Y.U.L REv. 961 (1967). For a note on the reversal at the Court of Appeals, see
Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process Does Not Require That a Student Be Afforded
the Right to Counsel at a Public School Suspension Hearing, 22 RUTGERs L. REV.
342 (1968).
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v. Bashful29 illustrate the weighing process. In Barker, ten students were
refused their request to be represented by legal counsel at the college's
disciplinary hearing. The court viewed three factors as not justifying
the need for counsel: the college did not have a lawyer present; each
student had the ability to defend himself since he was mature, educated
and well acquainted with the facts; and the other aspects of the hearing
taken as a whole appeared fair since each student was permitted to
bring a faculty member, a fellow student or his parents as an advisor,
to face his accuser, to produce witnesses and to be heard before a board
of six faculty members."0 A fourth factor supported the students' request
for counsel since they were subject to severe injury by suspension. In
upholding the college's refusal, the district court's decision implied that
the severity of the injury by itself would not off-set the other three
factors."
In Madera,2 a fourteen year old seventh grade public school student
was suspended from school by the principal for behavioral difficulties.
The principal notified the district superintendent of the suspension, who
in turn notified the student's parents, requesting their presence at a
guidance conference to be held in her office. After receiving the notice,
the parents sought the aid of legal counsel. The attorney wrote the
district superintendent asking to appear on behalf of the parents and
their son at the conference. He was advised that under existing rules
he could not attend the conference. The student and his parents brought
29. 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969).
30. 303 F. Supp. at 236-37.
31. The court based) its decision on two grounds: 1) its "reluctance to grant
adversary judicial status to student disciplinary hearings" and thus set new precedent
and 2) the fact that the hearing was investigative only and not adjudicative. Id.
Although the court may have reached the proper conclusion, neither ground satis-
factorily supported the conclusion.
The court declared that a balance should be made between the private interest
affected and the public interest involved. It then concluded "that in the circumstances
of this case" the denial of the request for counsel did not deny the students due
process. The circumstances which the court referred to were not discussed.
The second ground illustrated the confusion which could result when there has
been a failure to keep the investigation stage separate from the accusatory stage.
Although In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), held that due process did not require
counsel during the investigation stage of the administrative process, it had no applica-
tion to the accusatory stage. The court failed to consider that the hearing was being
held after the students already had been charged with the offense. Although the
hearing would gather evidence, it was long past the investigation stage. This error
went undiscussed by the court of appeals because it considered that since the district
court gave a trial de novo, any previous error on the college level was erased. Barker
v. Hardway, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969). A
similar misconception was displayed in Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812
(2d Cir. 1967). For a case comment on Barker, see 71 W. VA. L. REv. 187 (1969).
32. Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
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an action to restrain the board of education from conducting the hearing
without permitting legal counsel. Two factors warranted a conclusion
of no counsel: the school did not have a lawyer present and there seemed
to be no issue taken with the fairness of the hearing as a whole other
than with the counsel issue. The other two factors favored counsel: the
student did not have the ability to defend himself because he was only
fourteen and his parents did not have the ability to defend him because
they did not speak English and the student was subject to severe injury
since the guidance conference could ultimately result in the loss of
personal liberty to a child, a suspension which would be the functional
equivalent of his expulsion from the public schools or a withdrawal of
his right to attend public schools. The district court granted the in-
junction,"3 thus indicating that the severity of the injury coupled with
an inability to defend oneself could off-set an otherwise fair hearing
where the institution did not proceed through counsel.
The board of education appealed the issuance of the injunction and
the court of appeals held that the student was not entitled to counsel. "
In so doing, the court found all four factors to support a no-counsel
decision. In addition to the two accepted by the trial court, the appellate
court found that the presence of a lawyer was not necessary to provide
the student with the ability to defend himself:
Appellees here argue that the presence of a lawyer is necessary
because it is he "who has the communicative skill to express
the position of the student's parents when-because of lack of
education, inarticulateness, or simply awe of the array of highly
educated and articulate professionals in whose presence they
find themselves-they may themselves be unable to do so . .. ."
However, it does not appear that a lawyer could solve this
communication problem. Actually the trial record supports the
view, despite some testimony to the contrary... that the social
worker, who is allowed to attend the Guidance Conference,
would provide more adequate counsel to the child or the
parents than would a lawyer. 5
The court also viewed the student as not being subject to severe injury.
The guidance conference was a meeting to determine the student's future
educational welfare. It did not put his liberty in peril. The fact that the
child's education had been terminated without a hearing on the facts
33. Id.
34. Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
35. Id. at 788.
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appeared inconsequential to the court.3"
In the third case, French v. Bashful,17 the balance was in favor of
retained counsel.
Although the right to counsel was not among the rights
specifically enumerated by the court in Dixon, it cannot be
denied that the assistance of an attorney in a trial-type proceed-
ing is of considerable value. An attorney is experienced in legal
and quasi-legal proceedings. Counsel is best qualified to pre-
pare a defense to the charges, examine the evidence against the
defendant, cross-examine witnesses if such a right is permitted,
and to otherwise plead the defending student's cause.
In spite of the invaluable assistance to a defendant in a
university disciplinary proceeding, it may well be that in many
cases the student will not be at such a disadvantage so as to
require the assistance of counsel. But here there is more reason
for counsel than in most cases. The prosecution of the case was
conducted by Overton Thierry, a senior law school student, who
is now a member of Louisiana State Bar Association. A member
of the Discipline Committee testified that Thierry was chosen
to prosecute these cases because of his familiarity with legal
proceedings....
Of course, Thierry was not a lawyer at the time of the
hearings. But he had nearly completed his studies and was to be
admitted to the Louisiana State Bar Association in a very few
months. Surely, it cannot be doubted that his ability to conduct
himself in a proceeding of this sort was likely to be far superior
to that of the defendants who, as far as can be ascertained from
the record, had no legal education or experience whatsoever.
In view of the particular and special circumstances of this
case, we therefore hold that procedural due process requires
that these students be permitted to be represented by their
retained legal counsel at the hearings. 8
It is also of importance in French to note that the maximum possible
penalty was expulsion, an extreme peril disposition. Furthermore, there
was an additional infirmity in the proceedings; the discipline committee
did not put its findings into a report open to the student's inspection.
36. Id. at 784, 786, 788.
37. 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969).
38. Id. at 1337-38.
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Thus it would appear that the court could satisfy all four factors to
favor a right to counsel.
Right of an Indigent Student to Assigned Counsel
If due process requires that a student in a particular hearing has
a right to counsel, the question arises whether he is entitled to have the
university assign counsel to him if he is unable to employ his own
counsel. Although neither criminal cases nor juvenile court cases are
the guide to due process in administrative proceedings,"9 they do supply
a background against which administrative law questions can be con-
sidered. Gideon v. Wainzright" required the state to offer appointed
counsel for a defendant in a criminal proceeding when he is financially
unable to obtain one. In re Gault" extended this right to juveniles in
delinquency hearings. It may be contended that the student in a dis-
ciplinary hearing also lacks the skills essential to defend himself and
therefore requires appointed counsel when he is financially unable to
obtain one.42
French v. Bashful,"3 the first student discipline case to address itself
to the issue of appointed counsel, chose not to follow Gideon and Gault.
Instead, after finding that the university's refusal to permit the students
to have the assistance of their retained legal counsel at the hearing was
a denial of due process, the court, in dictum, opposed appointed counsel.
In holding as we do, we want to make it clear that we are
limiting this holding to retained legal counsel as opposed to
39. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 628 (W.D. Mo.
1968) ; 1 DAvis § 8.10, at 556.
40. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
41. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
42. See 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 961, 965 (1967); cf. Note, The College Student and
Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. REV. 87, 104-09 (1968). For a
discussion of the problems and solutions on the question of appointed counsel for
disciplinary hearings in the public schools, see Note, Constitutional Law--Due Process
Does Not Require That a Student Be Afforded the Right to Counsel at a Public
School Suspension Hearing, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 342, 356-60 (1968). Heyman,
Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CAL. L. REv. 73 (1966),
suggests :
Students should seek their own counsel; if the student is indigent, normally
voluntary representation will be possible, at least on a large campus. This
is especially true in cases involving political matters where organizations
like the American Civil Liberties Union are available. In other cases, should
an indigent student's efforts be unsuccessful, the university should help him
obtain representation. The problem is eased on campuses with law schools.
If the case burden is not severe, law teachers working with law students
(or in many instances, law students alone) can service the demand.
Id. at 80.
43. 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969).
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appointed counsel. In cases of this kind it is necessary to weigh
the interests of the two sides to the controversy.... When the
right to retained counsel is involved, we feel that any burden
which such a right places on the university is inconsequential
compared to the vital interest of the student in being represented
by counsel. But a similar holding as to appointed counsel would
have a far greater effect on the university. If a college adminis-
tration were forced to provide counsel for defendant students
at every disciplinary proceeding, the cost to the school would
be considerable. It is no secret that the universities are not
unlimited in their funds. It is therefore this Court's opinion
that this would be too high a price for a college to pay for the
privilege of enforcing discipline among its students.44
Authority, however, exists which requires counsel in certain circum-
stances.45 A panel of judges46 noted that
[t]here is no general requirement that procedural due process
in student disciplinary cases provide for legal representation
.... Rare and exceptional circumstances however, may require
provision of one or more . . . [procedural safeguards] in a
particular case to guarantee the fundamental concepts of fair
play. 7
The "rare and exceptional circumstances" rule bears a striking
resemblance to the "special circumstances" rule established for the right
to appointed counsel in criminal cases by Powell v. Alabama.4" Powell
held that "special circumstances" in capital cases required appointed
counsel to meet due process standards. Betts v. Brady" admitted the
possible existence of "special circumstances" in noncapital cases as well.
The "special circumstances" rule was abandoned in Gideon v.
Wainwright.5" Justice Harlan, concurring in the Gideon decision made
the following observation:
The principles declared in Powell and in Betts, however, had a
44. Id. at 1338.
45. See Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); French v.
Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1969); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp.
228, 237 (S.D. W. Va. 1968).
46. Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline
in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (1968).
47. Id. at 148-49.
48. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
49. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
50. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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troubled journey throughout the years that have followed first
the one case and then the other. Even by the time of the Betts
decision, dictum in at least one of the Court's opinions had
indicated that there was an absolute right to the services of
counsel in the trial of state capital cases. Such dicta continued
to appear in subsequent decisions, and any lingering doubts
were finally eliminated by the holding of Hamilton v.
Alabama ....
In noncapital cases, the "special circumstances" rule has
continued to exist in form while its substance has been sub-
stantially and steadily eroded. In the first decade after Betts,
there were cases in which the Court found special circumstances
to be lacking, but usually by a sharply divided vote. However,
no such decision has been cited to us, and I have found none,
after . . . 1950. At the same time, there have been not a few
cases in which special circumstances were found in little or
nothing more than the "complexity" of the legal questions
presented, although those questions were often of only routine
difficulty. The Court has come to recognize, in other words,
that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted
in itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel
at trial. In truth the Betts v. Brady rule is no longer a reality."
Assuming that there is an analogy between "rare and special circum-
stances" in student discipline cases and the "special circumstances" rule
that was used prior to Gideon in the criminal trial area, the student
rights decisions appear to be at the Betts v. Brady stage of development.
If history repeats itself, the "rare and special circumstances" rule will
erode to the point that the mere existence of the possibility that the
student would be subject to severe injury would in itself constitute the
circumstances requiring the services of counsel at the evidentiary hear-
ing. 2
Other Tangential Issues
In those cases where a right to counsel exists, the question then
arises whether the university has a duty to inform the student that he
has a right to retain his own counsel. Although there is no clear authority
51. Id. at 350-51 (Harlan, J. concurring).
52. The erosion may have begun as evidenced by French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp.
1333 (E.D. La. 1969). The court concentrated on the fact that the college was
represented by counsel and the student was not. This imbalance lead the court to
conclude that the student's ability to defend himself was jeopardized.
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on this point,5" the answer may rest on whether the student's failure
to have counsel was based on an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a fully known right. Even if a student has the right to have
counsel assigned, there is no authority that requires university officials
to advise him of this right to be provided with counsel."
In considering the role of counsel at the evidentiary hearing, many
questions may be raised. The basic question is whether counsel should
be permitted to participate actively in the hearing or whether he should
be restricted to merely advising his client. Although Columbia University
and Central Missouri State College are on record as permitting only the
student to present evidence," others, e.g., the University of California
at Berkeley, the University of Florida, Tennessee A & I State University,
Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh and the Louisiana State Board
of Education have permitted counsel to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses testifying against the student."
53. In Due v. Florida A & M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963), there
was no request by the student nor comment by the disciplinary committee with
respect to securing counsel. In contending that the hearing denied the student due
process, it is unclear whether the thrust was the right to counsel or the right to be
informed of this right to counsel. The court's response does not clarify the issue:
A fair reading of the Dixon case shows that is it not necessary to due
process requirements that a full scale judicial trial be conducted by a university
disciplinary committee with qualified attorneys either present or formally
waived as in a felonious charge under the criminal law.
Id. at 403.
Cases do exist in which the students have been informed prior to the hearing that
they had the right to be represented by counsel of their choice at the hearing. See
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) ; Goldberg
v. Regents of Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
54. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D. Colo. 1968).
55. Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo.
1967). In Goldwyn Iv. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967), the
attempt was made to permit counsel to attend the hearing before the assistant superin-
tendent of schools "as an observer only." Despite counsel's objections, the assistant
superintendent refused to permit counsel to actively participate in the conference in
behalf of his clients. Instead of discussing the role of counsel the court resolves the
case on the basis that the assistant superintendent had no authority to conduct the
hearing and therefore the student was denied a hearing.
56. Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562, 567 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Zanders v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 753 (W.D. La. 1968) (counsel even
permitted additional time to sum up each individual case) ; Jones v. State Bd. of Educ.,
279 F. Supp. 190, 194, 199 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of
California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Woody v. Burns, 188
So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
Heyman, Some Thought on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CAL. L. REV.
73 (1966), suggests that the student be given a choice between an informal hearing and
a formal hearing.
Students will be represented by lawyers only rarely if the informal hearing
is chosen. Counsel, if any, will be a layman who will help the stu-
dent by speaking with him, directing an occasional question to witnesses, and,
perhaps, addressing the committee in support of the student. A lawyer will want
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In certain situations counsel has been allowed to appear instead of
the student."' There may be a difference in the role of counsel depending
on whether he is constitutionally required or whether he is not required
but is permitted to be present by the institution. It would appear that
the gratuitous nature of counsel's presence should give the university
some discretion in determining counsel's role.
HEARINGS TO DETERMINE QUESTIONS OF LAW
The hearings to determine questions of law do not involve a dispute
over the facts which gave rise to the hearing. Instead, the parties agree
upon the facts but differ on the issue of whether the university's rule
deprives the student of a constitutional or statutory right such as freedom
of speech or assembly. In such a dispute, oral arguments are the most
convenient procedure.58 For the purposes of this article, such hearings
will be referred to as legal argument hearings.
The Dixon decision applies only to evidentiary hearings.5" There
are no student discipline cases establishing a right to a legal argument
hearing although many universities provide such hearings."0 Thus, only
to participate more fully. He may wish to cross-examine witnesses in detail,
put his client on the stand, and make motions concerning the admissibility of
evidence. That kind of participation may suggest to the university that its
case should also be presented by counsel, and what began as an informal
proceeding will tend to become adversary, and similar to the formal pro-
ceeding. If informality is desired, the participation of lawyer-counsel should
be limited to advising the student, seeking to ask questions of witnesses
through the committee (unless under the circumstances the committee deter-
mines that direct questioning would be helpful to it), and summarizing the
case for the student. This restriction on the role of lawyer-counsel for the
student is reasonable, furthermore, since the student may, by choosing the
more formal process, get the full participation of counsel.
The university should not be represented by counsel in an informal
proceeding.
Id. at 80.
57. In Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La.
1968), counsel appeared instead of the students at an evidentiary hearing. The initial
hearing, held on the college's campus with apparently all the 29 students present, was
defective since the students were expelled without the college presenting any evidence.
Id. at 752, 761. The students appealed to the State Board of Education which conducted
a hearing de novo. Only 14 of the 29 students made the trip to Baton Rouge for the
full evidentiary hearing. Counsel represented the other 15 students without them being
present. Id. at 753. In Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App.
2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), counsel was permitted to appear and fully participate
at the prehearing conference without the personal appearance of his clients.
In Grossner Iv. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 543 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), a private university would not permit the appearance of lawyers instead
of the students.
58. By analogy, a typical hearing before an appellate court is an argument,
not a trial. See 1 DAvIs § 7.07, at 432.
59. See notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text.
60. See Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 204 F. Supp. 725,
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when the university, in its discretion, chooses to use the hearing to
entertain oral arguments does the student's right to counsel become an
issue. It would appear, because of its gratuitous nature, that the granting
of a legal argument hearing would not require the university to grant a
right to counsel. Yet, if the university did allow participation of retained
counsel, an equal protection issue would be raised if the institution did
not appoint counsel for those who could not afford to retain an attorney.6
As in evidentiary hearings there is no authority to support the right of
the student to be informed of the university's policy of allowing counsel.6"
Because the structure of the legal argument hearing differs from
the evidentiary hearing, the role of counsel will also differ. In evidentiary
hearings the mere presence of an attorney may be of valuable assistance
since he can still advise the student of proper tactics, procedural rights
and advantageous cross-examination. Since the legal argument hearing
is essentially speech-making, the attorney must deliver the speech to be
of any substantial benefit to the client. 3 Thus, it would be inconsistent
to allow the attorney to be present but deny him an opportunity to
participate.
THE HEARING TO DETERMINE POLICY
A third type of hearing seeks to determine questions of policy and
731 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (dispute over whether due process requires presence of news-
paper reporter at hearing). The institution may be unaware that they are providing a
legal argument hearing for a non-factual issue. For example, in Barker v. Hardway,
283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W. Va. 1968),
[s]ix of the suspended students appeared before the Committee and upon
having their requests to be represented by legal counsel refused, read a
prepared statement and refused to go on with the hearing.
Id. at 234. The question on right to legal counsel was the non-factual issue in dispute.
The hearing consisted of reading a prepared statement-the speech-making type of
hearing and not the presentation of evidence. Accord, Hammond v. South Carolina
State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 949 (D.S.C. 1967) (right to counsel, confrontation and
cross-examination). Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524, 526 (E.D. La. 1967), appears
to be a case where a dispute over a non-fact issue (whether a public high school
grooming regulation violated freedom of expression) was aired at the hearing. The
student's attorney made an oral speech on this issue so as to make this part of the
hearing the argument type of hearing. The hearing also shaded into a trial type of
hearing when counsel was permitted to produce any information and evidence, including
the inspection of the student's hair.
61. Withholding the right to counsel from indigent students would be con-
stitutionally vulnerable on two grounds. Assuming that in a particular circumstance it
would be a denial of due process to not allow counsel, the decision to bar counsel
would deny due process to the student whether or not he could afford counsel. See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In addition, criteria which classifies
individuals on the basis of whether or not they can afford to exercise a certain right
has met increasing scrutiny by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois,
90 S. Ct. 2018 (1970).
62. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
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discretion and usually does not concern facts about the immediate
parties.6" In such hearings, herein referred to as legislative hearings,
the tribunal might consider the need for a certain rule or decide what
facts constitute a violation of the rule.65
[A] tribunal cannot think about issues of law or policy without
drawing upon such of its background of factual understanding
as it deems relevant. What we call "judgment" is usually a
mixture of many ingredients-ideas, imagination, memory of
experience, memory of facts, and other mental processes. The
tribunal draws upon the experience of its members, and it is free
to do research beyond the record .... ..
Legislative hearings may be structured as a trial or as an oral agrument.
If evidentiary facts are in dispute, the trial structure may be more con-
ducive in the ascertainment of truth. However, most legislative hearings
employ oral argument similar to legal argument hearings.6" "The ques-
tion of whether to use the method of trial for legislative facts is one of
convenience, not one of legal right."6
In student disciplinary hearings the dean of students and his staff
or a university committee may have all the testimony to present at a
legislative hearing. Often, the student will have little or nothing to
contribute. The right of a student to participate at such a hearing is not
found in the Dixon decision.6" More specifically, there is no student
discipline case which states that due process requires such a hearing,
64. See generally 1 DAvis § 7.06, at 429-32.
65. Mollere v. Southeastern Louisiana College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La.
1969), posed the question whether state college girls under the age of twenty-one
could constitutionally be required to pay more than other students to support the
college's housing system. In resolving the issue, the court considered the following
legislative facts:
It is undisputed that the College's sole reason for requiring that women under
21 and freshmen men live in college residence halls was to meet the financial
obligations which arose out of the construction of those dormitories. When
the Court specifically asked Mrs. Parker, the Dean of Women, the reason
for the requirement, she testified that the sole and only reason was to
increase the revenue of the housing system. Indeed, when she was asked why
this particular category of students was chosen she replied that the girls in
this group together with the freshman boys comprised the precise number
needed to fill the dormitory vacancies. This was confirmed by the Auditor
of the University, and their testimony was not contradicted by any other
College official.
Id. at 827.
66. 1 DAvIs § 7.06, at 429.
67. Id. at 431.
68. Id.
69. See notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text. See also 1 DAis § 7.06, at
429-32.
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although many institutions provide one. Consider the problem at the
University of Colorado in Buttny v. Smiley" which arose from a protest
demonstration at the university placement service on campus. At the
disciplinary hearing
[e]ach plaintiff was given the right to testify in his own behalf,
not only to testify factually but to give his reasons for his action
and even to expound his political philosophy, including his
criticisms of American foreign policy and the C.I.A. Each
respective student was allowed to testify as he desired whether
or not the testimony had any relevance to the facts. Even persons
who had no knowledge of the facts were allowed to testify on
behalf of the plaintiffs. A Dr. Richard Maskowitz, not a mem-
ber of the University community as such, testified and read into
the record part of a paper excoriating the C.I.A. and attempting
to justify the students' action here. The document itself
appears in the record as an exhibit. None of these things
would ordinarily be done in any court of law. The University
administration went far beyond what was required of them
in receiving evidence submitted by the students. 1
The evidence beyond the facts pertaining to these students could be
considered legislative facts and the method of presentation, speechmaking,
could be considered an oral argument type of hearing.
If the university decides not to provide a legislative hearing, there
is no counsel problem. However, if the university decides to provide a
hearing on the dispute over legislative fact, it has the option of either
providing a trial type or an argument type of hearing. The existence
of the choice complicates the counsel issues. The right to counsel in
either case would depend upon the fact that the granting of either type
of hearing would be gratuitous. If counsel were permitted, then the
right to appointed counsel would be a pertinent issue for either form of
hearing." A distinction would occur in counsel's role at the hearing.
In the trial type of hearing where witnesses are presented, the lawyer's
role would be quite different from that in the argument type of hearing
where merely a persuasive argument is made.
STUDENTS' RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN PRACTICE
There exists at present a void in understanding between laymen
70. 281 F. Supp. (D. Colo. 1968).
71. Id. at 288.
72. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
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(student and administrator alike) and lawyers. Even where the right
to counsel exists, the normal student who has been involved in an
individual offense ranging in seriousness from possession of marijuana
to violation of dormitory hours, as opposed to a mass demonstration
violation, shuns counsel.
The student's reluctance to retain counsel may stem from his fear
of offending the institution. If he is represented by counsel at the hearing,
the hearing board may be more prone to mete out discipline."3 He may
feel that his problem with the institution is personal and therefore he
dislikes involving others, especially strangers. He may feel a sense of
martyrdom when he receives discipline or he may not wish to give up
the spotlight to a lawyer and thereby lose the attention which he is
getting. The student may resist counsel because he identifies counsel with
his parents and the establishment. The thought of expense of retention
and the inability to identify a lawyer who would be available also may
dissuade a student from obtaining counsel. The student may not be fully
aware of the seriousness of the offense. Often it is difficult for a freshman
to realize just how injurious suspension or expulsion will be. This is
illustrated when he retains counsel for the criminal charge but not for
the institutional charge resulting from the same acts. The student also
may feel that counsel cannot help him in institutional discipline since
lawyers are useful only in court.
Not all student reaction is unfavorable to counsel. Some feel that
the lawyer is necessary because he has the communicative skill to
express the student's position better. He is more educated, more articulate,
more respected and more in command of the situation than the student.
He is now in awe of the array of highly educated and lucid professionals
in whose presence the hearing is held.7" The student may feel that
without the assistance of counsel he might incriminate himself."' In
addition, he may fear that statements made by him during the hearing
might be admitted into evidence against him in subsequent court
proceedings."'
The administrator's aversion to counsel is based on his feeling that
counsel signifies his loss of control over discipline. The lawyer represents
an encroachment into the domain which once belonged solely to the
administrator. His honest exercise of discretion is challenged. He may
no longer retain the in loco parentis attitude that he has held for so
73. See Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 202-03 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
74. Accord, Madera v. Board of Educ., 368 F.2d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 1967).
75. See Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 949
(D.S.C. 1967).
76. Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 355, 360, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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many years. The presence of counsel invites formality.77 He is required
to make written records which are subject to review and scrutiny by
others. His position as the center of attraction will no longer exist
because the lawyer will speak in terms that the administrator will not
understand and he will introduce technicalities which will confuse the
administrator and delay discipline."8 Some administrators do realize that
the institution may receive benefits by having the student represented by
counsel. For example, counsel's presence may help to ameliorate any
possible prejudice in the case created by procedural irregularities that
may have occurred during the hearing."
Although law writers favor counsel for the disciplinary processes
when the student is subject to severe disciplinary penalties,"0 a practi-
tioner may be less receptive to the idea. The fee which he could charge
77. Id. at 373. ("the presence of an attorney would change a 'therapeutic' confer-
ence into an adversary proceeding, to the great detriment of any children involved");
Cosme v. Board of Educ. 50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ("the
very purpose of the interview would be frustrated or impeded by presence of counsel, who
might be tempted to turn the conference into a quasi-judicial hearing"). On appeal, the
Madera court stated that
[t]he mere attendance of counsel at the conference would do little to aid in
finding the truth without also granting the other rights accorded in adversary
proceedings--calling of witnesses, cross-examinations, etc. This would be
destructive to the original purpose of the conference-to provide for the
future education of the child.
Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 1967).
78. Counsel can cause unnecessary distractions. For example in Goldberg v.
Regents of Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), counsel
staged a walk-out. Hearings may have to be set or postponed to accommodate counsel
when he is unavailable. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 285 F. Supp. 936, 941, 944 (E.D.N.Y.
1968); Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 949 (D.S.C.
1967); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967). Social workers may be more able to solve the communication
problem. Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 1967). In addition,
if it is required that the indigent be provided with counsel, the possible introduction of
legal maneuvering and delaying tactics into the system may cause the hearing to
proceed more slowly, the slower proceedings will create a backlog of cases before the
hearing board, and there may not be a sufficient number of lawyers trained to handle
the specialized problems which arise in institutional discipline. 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 961,
965 (1967).
79. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731
(M.D. Ala. 1968) (presence of counsel helped to disperse any possible prejudice
caused by a closed hearing).
80. Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CAL.
L. REv. 73, 79 (1966); Kutner, Habeas Scholastica: An Ombudsman for Academic
Due Process-A Proposal, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 107, 147 (1968); Sherry, Governance
of the University: Rules, Rights and Responsibilities, 54 CAL. L. REv. 23, 37 (1966);
Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582, 593 (1968)
Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1075-76
(1969) ; Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process Does Not Require That a Student
Be Afforded the Right to Counsel at a Public School Suspension Hearing, 22 RUTGERS
L. REv. 342 (1968); Note, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary
Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. Rav. 87, 104-11 (1968).
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might constitute a financial loss. The injury to be suffered by the student
may not be of such magnitude as to justify a larger fee. The practitioner
may feel that "his client can take care of himself" since the institution
will treat him fairly. Therefore, he sees no need to represent his client
at the institutional hearing but only at the criminal court hearing which
is being held on the same facts. The attorney also may be wary of
offending the institution or of creating a conflict of interests since he
may directly or indirectly receive other business from the institution. In
addition, the attorney may desire to avoid the administrative hearings
because he is inexperienced in this forum. If he does take the case, he
would rather rely on judicial relief than seek administrative remedies.
CONCLUSION
If pre-hearing procedures have been used to limit and focus the
issues to be presented at the disciplinary hearing, the analysis of this
article will be useful. The analysis may also be beneficial in hindsight
when the transcript of the hearing can be reviewed and the issues isolated
and labeled evidentiary, legislative or legal. Analysis is more complicated
at the beginning of the hearing when no pre-hearing procedures have
been used to screen the issues. When, as in Barker v. Hardway,8 ' the
students demanded counsel at the opening of the hearing and the board
had no idea of what issues would eventually be presented, the board
must determine whether evidentiary fact issues will be raised. If so,
the case is governed by Dixon and the students are entitled to a trial
type of hearing on such issues. The hearing board must then determine
whether circumstances exist which require an attorney's presence.8 2
Once counsel has been admitted to the hearing, he will be present when
other types of issues arise. There would no longer be a question of right
to counsel. Instead the question would be first whether a hearing should
be permitted for the issue being raised and second what type of hearing.
If the issue were one of legislative fact, the board could refuse to hear
any evidence on it since the university would not be required to grant a
hearing on this issue. If the board, however, decided to air the issue,
they could choose between the trial type and the argument type of hear-
ing. The question to be evaluated then would be the role of counsel in
this hearing.
The problem of defining in what situations the right to counsel
should be extended to disciplinary hearings may admit of no simple
solution. As the law presently stands, it can only be said that there may
81. 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W. Va. 1968).
82. See notes 14-39 supra and accompanying text.
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be factors which warrant a right to counsel. No doubt, as students
become more aware of the seriousness of the various disciplinary
hearings and of their rights in such hearings, the factors supportive of
the right will be more fully articulated by the courts. It is now clear,
however, that students, administrators and attorneys are reluctant to
extend the right to counsel. 8 Such attitudes reflect a gap in understand-
ing between lawyers and laymen. The result is that even where a right
to counsel exists, it is seldom used or, if used, rarely protects the student's
interests or improves the quality of administrative discipline. Today,
in an era of dynamic student activism, the gaps of understanding must
be filled to insure that due process is given proper consideration in
establishing and conducting the disciplinary hearing.
83. See notes 74-81 supra and accompanying text.
